Nixon and Ford: "Emergency Repairs" and "Damage Control"

By the time Nixon took the White House, Unger had ceased to be surprised by the mission he had in mind: strengthening the hold of the government on the nation, and thereby increasing the power of the Emergency State. What was surprising was the extent to which he took this mission, and how clumsily it was done.




Nixon was his own special kind of crazy, and also the only president to ever resign from his post. Essentially, he (and his administration) used the FBI and CIA (among other government agencies) to bug the offices of his political opponents, harass activist groups, and finally attempt to cover up the shady goings-on that surrounded the Watergate Scandal, when 5 men broke into the Democratic National Committee.




Upon investigation into the incident, the courts uncovered plenty of illegal activities in which the president had participated/had knowledge of and didn't reveal to the public. Facing a seriously awkward situation, and almost certain impeachment, Nixon resigned in an attempt to retain a small amount of his personal dignity.




I don't think I need to go into the clauses and amendments and rights that Nixon violated. It's pretty clear why bugging offices, ordering harassment of anyone, and/or covering up national crimes are generally a bad ideas when you're the president.




Ultimately, Unger thinks that in trying to tighten the emergency state, he actually accomplished the opposite, "discredit[ing] three crucial pillars of the emergency state--the White House, the CIA, and the FBI" (Unger).

Ford is a relatively minor character in Unger's account of American History. He mentions him long enough to say that he handled the aftermath of Watergate poorly, and like the rest of everyone ever in the White House, was over-obsessed with national security and the power of the president. He added to the illegitimate image that Nixon created for the FBI, CIA, and White House.

Lyndon Johnson: "Tunnel Vision"

Johnson took over when JFK was assassinated, promising to continue in the line JFK had drawn. While this wasn't necessarily Unger's favorite idea, the issue was that Johnson didn't do this. In fact, Unger doesn't seem to think that Johnson really did much of what he told the public he was going to do at all.




According to Unger, Johnson was big on "saving face". If he didn't think the public would support him in a decision, he lied to them about what he was going to do, and went right along with whatever it was.




Most prominently, Johnson lied about his intent to escalate American presence in Vietnam. He found that as long as he was not telling the truth, the people supported him, and he was able to conveniently by-pass congress.




Lies and lack of transparency in the government's actions made the whole democracy deal a little bit sticky. With the people generally clueless/misinformed about what was actually going on in Vietnam, and the President acting outside of Congress' control, no one was there to check the power of the president.

JFK: "Belated Realism"

"John F. Kennedy made the executive unaccountable for its decisions by creating the position of national security adviser, a post subject to neither congressional confirmation nor oversight" (Greenberg). 

Essentially JFK (like each of the other presidents Unger writes about) continued his predecessors' cycle of democratic destruction. He "pursues universal containment with new vigor" (100) in order to "assure the survival and success of liberty" (102). However, in doing so, Unger says that he not only disregarded American interest, but actually undermined it in his pursuit of international democracy. 

However, JFK's biggest failing is in the well known Bay of Pigs Fiasco in April of 1961, and more importantly in his response to it. First of all, Unger makes it clear that Cuba did not pose any direct threat to the US. However, "neither party dared consider the idea of coexisting with an increasingly communist regime ninety miles off Key West" (Unger 104). So, despite the fact that it was needless, JFK went ahead with the planned invasion. However, when the cover was story and he was left with awkward choice between outright american intervention and leaving the Cuban exiles to their fate, JFK went with option 2. 

Even worse than this decision, Unger argues, is that afterwards, JFK was actively angry with the CIA for failing to give him enough information to operate on, which landed him in an awkward position. Kennedy didn't learn from the error, and lessen his dependency on such institutions, he strengthened his hold on them.

Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Runaway Train"

Unger has some witty chapter titles, and Eisenhower's "Runaway Train" is no exception. He is so exquisitely pessimistic that I can't help but laugh sometimes. He outdoes my mom in the cynicism category, which is actually difficult.




But anyways, Eisenhower. He was a follower, not a leader. Which is funny (or maybe not?) because he was, after all, the President. He was the runaway train that just continued down the path he inherited, not stopping to think of the consequences, or alternative courses of action. He was the willing heir of the powerful presidency. 




Unger's first bone to pick with Eisenhower is his nomination as the republican candidate, rather than Taft. Not really his fault, but Unger goes on to say that the fact that it isn't his fault is almost scarier than if it was. But I get ahead of myself. The issue with this decision was the difference in Eisenhower and Taft's proposed platforms. Where Taft wanted to restore the constitutionally restrained executive government and limit US involvement in overseas affairs (*Unger cheering wildly*),  Eisenhower was the candidate of the Emergency State (*Unger booing*). In Eisenhower's nomination, Unger argues, is the victory of the emergency state in public opinion. And if the people accept the emergency state, then what is there left to stop it? (this is the stuff of Unger's most terrifying nightmares).




The other of Unger's issues with Eisenhower was the way in which he handled Soviet Russia (surprise, surprise!). When Stalin died, Unger thinks that Eisenhower should have first had a party and then reached out to Russia in hopes of compromising with the wounded nation. But Eisenhower didn't do that. In his "Chance for Peace" speech, Eisenhower leaves no room for a Russian compromise. Rather, he seems to foolishly expect Russia to come groveling at his feet, begging for forgiveness and friendship. He offers a plan for peace with the soviets--if they do everything he asks, he will stop the "fighting". The "no deal" verdict was hard and fast, and essentially allowed Russia all the encouragement they needed to return to the old familiar ways--Stalin's ways. Thus, Eisenhower perpetuated the cold war and the dictatorship of the Soviets.




Unger sees all of this as essentially a power struggle with Russia. Eisenhower refused to step off his high presidential horse in order to do what was actually best for the nation, and in doing so, strengthened the growing emergency state.

Harry Truman: "The Framing of the Permanent Emergency State"

At least FDR was a war-time president, which made his actions more legit, and his offenses less grievous. Truman was a peace-time president, yet Unger claims he continued down the path of FDR's "emergency state", so we should all be confused by that.




When he took over for FDR, Truman continued the "emergency, keeping the nation in its state of unlimited national emergency (that FDR had declared in 1941) until 1947, two years after the war had ended. This is a huge no-no for Unger, who cites this occurrence as being the beginning of the peacetime emergency state--the kind of emergency that has "no logical termination..." (Unger 51).




In addition, Unger believes that Truman essentially "picked the fight" that led the US into the cold war. Rather than using diplomacy to "pursue a more nuanced relationship with soviet Russia..." (Unger 55), Truman bulled ahead with blatant anti-Soviet policy such as his "Truman Doctrine" which stated that the US would help out Greece and Turkey so that they didn't fall under the control of the Soviet dictatorship.

As this announcement set the cold war into action, Truman "oversaw the passage of the 1947 national security act, which created the architecture of emergency state government..." (Greenberg 1) which consisted of the Department of Defense, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council.

Essentially, Truman set up an illogical, and interminable emergency state. Without war, he should have repealed some of FDR's more war-oriented policies. Instead, he strengthened them.